The paper reviews the framework for choice of avoidance law applicable to a transaction, which occurred prior to the opening of the insolvency proceedings, under the European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings. It outlines this framework and the interaction of the choice of law rules with the rules on jurisdiction, in particular with the system of main and secondary insolvency proceedings.
I. Introduction

III. Choice of law framework
The choice of law rules are intertwined with the jurisdiction rules, both for the non-insolvency fraudulent conveyance remedies and insolvency avoiding powers. The issues of jurisdiction being a background against which the choice of law rules operate, I address them first.
A. Jurisdiction out of Insolvency
The Brussels I Regulation, which sets forth uniform rules of jurisdiction for civil and commercial disputes within EU, contains a carve-out for any issues related to insolvency proceedings. 39 
If a remedy "derive[s] directly from the bankruptcy or winding-up and [is] closely connected with the proceedings
for the" liquidation or reorganization, it is subject to insolvency rules of jurisdiction. 40 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided in Reichert I 41 and Reichert II 42 cases that a noninsolvency fraudulent conveyance action can be brought only in the courts of the member state where the defendant (the beneficiary) has its habitual residence. With respect to the purely non-insolvency fraudulent conveyance claims, this seems to be true even when insolvency proceedings are opened against the debtor, if the stay resulting from opening of the insolvency proceedings does not prevent the creditor from bringing the claim. 
B. Jurisdiction in Insolvency
The Regulation prescribes uniform rules of jurisdiction and choice of law for insolvency proceedings within the EU (except for Denmark). There are always only one main insolvency proceedings, opened in the member state, where the debtor's center of main interests (the COMI) is located (the home state). There can be multiple secondary insolvency proceedings, opened in any member state where the debtor has an establishment. 44 The opening of the main insolvency proceedings has EU-wide effects and court decisions issued any court given jurisdiction under Regulation enjoy automatic recognition, subject only to a "manifestly contrary to the public order" exception. 45 The Regulation sets forth a presumption that COMI is located in the member state of the debtor's registered office. 46 However, this presumption is often rebutted and courts tend to assume jurisdiction over large cases, often filed in the state, where the group headquarters are located. 47 The ECJ held, in its decision in Deko Marty, 48 that courts of the member state within which the main (or the secondary) 49 proceedings are pending have jurisdiction to adjudicate avoidance actions brought within the respective proceedings. The case arose when a German trustee sued a Belgian beneficiary in front of a German court, other than the court (also German), in front of which the 44 court accepted its jurisdiction in a preference case brought by the trustee of an insolvent German company against its Austrian sole shareholder and managing director.
57
The trustee was seeking to avoid repayment of a shareholder loan, which was voidable under a special provision of German insolvency law.
58
The Austrian court read the Regulation's choice of law provisions as referring also to procedural law and applied German rules determining venue; this analysis required the action to be heard by the courts of defendant's domicile, i.e. Austrian courts.
59
The court's analysis implied that German substantive law would be applicable to the merits.
The Regulation does not contain rules, which would prevent parallel litigation of the avoidance issues in different jurisdictions. 60 However, given that the jurisdiction in the main and secondary proceedings established by the Regulation is dominant and the choice belongs to the trustee, there should be no risk of parallel litigation.
61
C. Choice of Law out of Insolvency
Within EU, there is no uniform choice-of-law rule for fraudulent conveyances, as this remedy is not recognized to be part of either the contract law or non-contractual obligations 62 law, two areas of law for which uniform choice of law rules have been adopted. 63 Therefore, each member state applies [OLG] The German fraudulent conveyance act submits the fraudulent conveyance issues to the law governing the challenged act.
69
Neither Czech, French nor English law have any clear choice-of-law rule for fraudulent conveyances, 70 although it seems that a Czech court will apply Czech law if it has jurisdiction over the defendant and the assets on the theory that fraudulent conveyance law is a part of the law of judicial execution. 71 In the U.S., the applicable state, i.e. non-insolvency, fraudulent conveyance remedies (as opposed to the federal remedies set forth in the bankruptcy code) are determined on the basis of a multilateral multi-factor analysis, searching for the law with the most significant relationship to the transaction.
72
The U.S. courts hold clearly that "a fraudulent conveyance 
IV. Proposed Choice of Law Rules
As suggested above, the generally accepted reading of Article 13 does not seem acceptable and needs to be challenged (subsection A). This has, however, a direct implication for the Regulation's system of allocating the avoidance actions to main or secondary proceedings (subsection B).
A. Safe Harbor
Article 13 of the Regulation provides safe harbor to a detrimental act if the "said act is subject to" a law that does not allow it to be avoided. In some cases, the challenged act is subject to only one law.
However, with major cross-border transactions it might be often difficult to identify the law, to which an act is subject as a whole, the options comprising the lex causae, lex rei sitae or another law, such as the law governing the exchange, where the contract was entered into. 109 In addition, the law governing a contract need not have any relationship to the interests at stake, especially where foreign contract law is used only for its convenience, which is usual practice not only in many new member states. To make the framework functional, the closest connection should be applied in ambiguous situations also to the allocation of avoidance actions between the main and the secondary proceedings.
However, the fact that secondary proceedings should properly stretch only to assets, which would be within such proceedings had the challenged act not taken place should be taken into account to limit the 123 See e.g. Insolvency Act, 1986, s. 240(2) (enabling avoidance against beneficiary's successor, subject to a good faith defense, if the later transfer was for value), Insolvenzordnung, § 145(2) (enabling avoidance against beneficiary's successor only if the latter had actual knowledge of the circumstances making the first transfer avoidable), Code de Commerce, art. L632-1 (which does not seem to enable recovery of a preferential (cash) payment from any other person than the direct beneficiary) 124 Regulation, arts. 3(2), 18(2) (or the assets have been removed from the jurisdiction by an avoidable act), Virgos Schmit In such case, it would be unfair to apply the law of the main proceedings;
Article 13 under the closest connection reading sufficiently protects the beneficiary. 150 However, under the plain reading it does not provide such protection. A flat home state rule would fail to provide such protection and, despite its predictability, cannot be considered sufficiently fair.
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Where a (sophisticated) beneficiary could and should have expected the application of the avoidance law of the main or secondary proceedings, he has no legitimate expectations worth of protection.
152
In fact, banks and other sophisticated parties are aware of the avoidance regime and structure transactions so as not to be caught by these rules.
153
They should apparently not be able to choose the applicable avoidance law.
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The plain reading of Article 13 fails again also in this respect unless a theory of fraudulent manipulation of the connecting factor is given substantial role. "first, that the transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal application of the conditions . . . , result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions. Second, it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage."
157
If the references to grant of tax advantage are replaced by "designation of applicable law", no abuse could be proved where the non-avoiding law selected by the parties was within the range of reasonably available laws. Therefore, it does not seem that the theory of abuse of right is a good tool to fix the problems caused by plain reading of Article 13, a reading which appears to select an inappropriate rule of choice of law in the first place.
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The fact that most European legal orders do not enable discovery within collection of evidence is also relevant for this conclusion.
C. Forum shopping
Whether or not it is considered bad VAT deductions on costs of construction, but set up an artificial scheme of subsidiaries so as to meet the formal requirements for deduction of the VAT at the level of subsidiary and to transfer the benefit to the parent through financing arrangement) 158 Klumb Kollisionsrecht, at 109 -111, suggests that a choice of law agreement or other displacement of connecting factor should be also subject to avoidance and that in such case, there should be no safe harbor to protect either the choice of law provision or the transaction itself from avoidance. This does not seem a viable strategy, as it operates without regard to the interests in question and basically removes the safe harbor for most transactions. is not impossible 161 and occurs in a non-negligible number of cases. 162 Firms with substantial presence in more than one member state (or their creditors) are generally able to select the forum and the law of the main proceedings due to the fuzziness of the concept of COMI and the willingness of the courts to accept cases. Migration of companies in a pre-insolvency stage is also possible. 163 In a world, in which debtors and creditors manage to forum shop, the advantages of the flat home state rule are lost. 164 The rule stops being predictable and the necessary connection between the priority scheme, the avoidance law and the interests so protected is completely displaced. Imagine a Czech company being put in administration under English law and its pre-insolvency transactions being assessed according to this law. 165 Given that no-one could predict whether English or Czech law would apply, there is no predictability and no reasonable relationship between the avoidance law, priority scheme and the interests involved -these being those of the Czech workers and government.
The system of main and secondary proceedings under the Regulation avoids such results. Even when the location of the debtor's COMI is really ambiguous, the debtor will either have a presence amounting to an establishment in each of the states possibly claiming jurisdiction. In the specific case where the main proceedings are opened in the state of debtor's registered office 166 or of the group headquarters establishment in the state, where it actually does business. The trustee in the main proceedings can thus challenge transactions which are not avoidable under the law of the main proceedings by opening secondary proceedings in the other state and requesting the trustee appointed in such proceedings to file an avoidance action. 168 The threat of secondary proceedings thus restricts the ability of the debtor or of the beneficiary to engage in forum shopping in order to avoid the application of unfavorable avoidance law.
The possibility of forum shopping requires that the allocation of avoidance actions between the main and secondary proceedings, which is based on the location of assets test, 
VI. Implications
The above analysis has shown that the framework established by the Regulation properly addresses the basic issues arising with respect to choice of applicable avoidance law. However, this does not mean that the current framework of community and member states' law is perfect; three particular issues come to sight.
A. Choice of law for non-insolvency fraudulent conveyance remedies
The non-insolvency fraudulent conveyance remedies provided by a legal system are, at least in insolvency by an English court) and at 396, para. 7.77 (noting that courts of other member states follow the same 
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A creditor may avail itself of such remedies whether or not the insolvency law of such member state is applicable to the debtor, i.e.
whether the debtor has its COMI or establishment within such member state. Among the member states studied, only Germany appears to have a formulated choice of law rule for these remedies (applying the law governing the transaction -the governing law rule).
177
Given that the choice of law rules at European level are being harmonized, 178 a common uniform multilateral choice of law rule would be appropriate in this area, as it would reduce the risks in transaction planning. The following consideration should inform its content.
Filing of an insolvency petition should not alter the (avoidance) law applicable to a transaction, even if an additional layer of the insolvency avoiding powers is put in place. would be, within insolvency, protected by the Regulation's safe-harbor. On the other hand, proper transaction structuring could be used to avoid the application of some non-desirable non-insolvency avoidance laws. For example, if outside of insolvency a particular transaction would be subject to Czech fraudulent conveyance law, the possibility of applying German insolvency fraudulent conveyance law could induce filing of an insolvency petition or at least of filing it in Germany. Therefore, the choice of law rule for non-insolvency fraudulent conveyance remedies should be the same as the rule argued for above for the definition of the law of the safe harbor, 180 i.e. it should follow the logic of closest connection analysis and should generally point to the debtor's COMI at the time of the relevant transaction, absent special circumstances, such as a transaction made from an establishment or a bundle of relationships fully located abroad. Particular attention should be given to the fact that the relationship of the debtor and plaintiff creditor might be only one of a number of debtor-creditor relationships relevant for the determination of the law with the closest connection to the case.
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The proposed rule corresponds much better to the interests at stake than the governing law rulewhether it is the location of the asset or a choice of law clause in the contract, the connecting factor need not have any relationship to the interests protected by the non-insolvency fraudulent conveyance law (i.e. the interest that a creditor enforcing its judgment is not harmed by the debtor concealing its assets).
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This rule could be adopted by member states' courts without specific legislative intervention. To be sure, the benefits of such intervention would be far outweighed by the cost of the legislative process; however, in a future amendment to the Regulation, a provision to this effect could be included, despite the fact that it does not belong to the insolvency law proper. The Regulation gives standing to bring any "action to set aside which is in the interest of the creditors" only to the trustee in the secondary proceedings. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, the trustee is authorized to assert any state-law fraudulent conveyance claim as long as there is at least one creditor authorized to assert such claim. 191 However, the trustee may assert such claim for the benefit of the estate (i.e. for all the creditors and not just those having actual standing) and the transaction can be avoided fully, not only to the extent to which it could be avoided by the creditors under non bankruptcy law.
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This creates anomalies by allowing the trustee to distribute proceeds of a non bankruptcy avoidance action to all the creditors, even if, outside of bankruptcy, only certain creditors would be entitled to recover such proceeds and only to the extent of their unsatisfied claims. 193 These parameters have been criticized for creating incentives for initiating bankruptcy even when it is not necessary or to avoid it, where it is necessary. Such critique fits squarely within Thomas Jackson's general theory that opening of insolvency petition should alter the legal rights of the parties only to the extent necessary to protect the collective character of such proceedings. 194 Under this theory, the non-insolvency avoiding powers should also not be altered, though may be subject to collectivization. Nevertheless, such powers are in many instances altered by the sole fact that creditors are barred by the automatic stay at least from reducing their claim to a judgment, which is often a requirement for bringing a fraudulent conveyance action. 195 Some of the member states studied (Czech Republic, Germany) explicitly stay fraudulent conveyance actions pending upon opening of the insolvency proceedings. 196 This stay would not apply to a lawsuit already pending in another member state, 197 the proceedings. 198 As an example, a debtor with its COMI in Czech Republic enters into a transaction with respect to a German property with a German counter party prejudicing German creditors, e.g. contractors working on the property. Under certain circumstances, such a transaction might be open to challenge under German non-insolvency fraudulent conveyance law, but by no means under Czech law. 199 The German fraudulent conveyance law is properly applicable under the closest connection standard, but at the time of insolvency, the debtor has no establishment in Germany and secondary proceedings are therefore not available. 200 As a result, Czech trustee is not able to avoid the transfer and due to automatic stay and discharge, the creditors will also lose this right. 201 To preserve the collective nature of the proceedings and to enable recovery despite collective action problems within the creditor body, it would be useful if the trustee in the main proceedings had the power to assert such non-insolvency avoidance remedies. 202 Assertion of these remedies by the trustee might, however, be trumped by the conditions of standing -the plaintiff must be a creditor and sometimes have the claim reduced to judgment. I would therefore propose that the Regulation be debtor was divested, i.e. belonging to the estate; this will be decided according to the law of the proceedings, interpreted 203 or amended 204 so as to give the trustee standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance action.
The trustee should have the power to bring an avoidance action under any applicable noninsolvency law, which could be brought by any creditor, but only for the benefit of and to the extent available to all such creditors. 205 Unless all the creditors having the right to bring the action agree otherwise, bringing of the action by the trustee would enjoin the creditors from bringing it. In addition, no enforceable judgment on the claim would be required from the trustee. Such rule would be properly adopted on the community level, as it would alter the legal position under both the applicable insolvency law and the non-insolvency law of different member states.
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C. Safe harbor limitation to Member States' laws
The Regulation, though, restricts the operation of the safe harbor to member states' law. If the closest connection analysis (based on a presumption favoring COMI) within the safe harbor test designates a law of a non-member state (or Denmark), it means that this law has (much) greater interest in deciding the issue of avoidability than the home state law. In such case, it does not make sense to avoid the transaction simply because the language of the Regulation enables that. Also, it does not make sense to restrict the safe harbor to the laws of member states based on an assumption that such laws have a closer conception of avoidability and the law of a non-member state could have virtually any kind of rules, thus providing unreasonably broad defense to the beneficiary. If the law of a non-member state trumps the presumptions inherent in the closest connection test as argued for above, there is simply no reason to extend application of the home state law.
Therefore, I suggest that the safe harbor be interpreted so as to apply also if the law designated is a law of a non-member state. This could be achieved as an interpretation of the Regulation, i.e. as a rule of community law, or as a solution particular to each member state's national law. As the Regulation contains a choice of law rule, to which this would be an exception, 211 I think that it would be more appropriate to consider this to be a interpretation of the Regulation applicable at the level of community law.
Among the member states studied, 212 only Germany has adopted a rule similar to the Regulation's safe harbor for situations not covered by the Regulation, although it seems that this is uniformly interpreted as requiring the plain reading analysis. 213 Interpreting the safe harbor of the Regulation as suggested above would cause this German rule to be applicable only to fully noncommunity situations.
VII. Conclusion
No simple choice of law rule for avoidance actions is on the shelf. The closest connection reading of the safe harbor and the same analysis of the question of allocation of avoidance actions among the main and secondary proceedings are the best alternatives within the framework the Regulation, making such framework coherent and corresponding to the policies at issue. It forces the judge to choose the applicable law rather than to avoid the choice thereof by a mechanical plain reading rule. However, the tests are still quite burdensome and not completely predictable and it is arguable that some kind of harmonization of the avoidance remedies, at least in the context of business insolvency, might be advantageous to further integration and development of European common market.
This analysis leads to proposal of new rules, whether as proposed interpretation or future legislation. The choice of law rule for non-insolvency fraudulent conveyance actions should be based on the same principles as the closest connection analysis for the safe harbor provision, i.e. generally referring to the debtor's COMI or establishment. This would be beneficial to legal certainty and would fit within the already undertaken effort to unify the choice of law rules for the law of obligations.
Giving the trustee in the main proceedings standing to bring such non-insolvency actions by a rule of community law will bridge a mismatch between the laws of different member states identified in this paper. Finally, the safe harbor provision should be extended to all cases coming within the Regulation, i.e. it should not be limited to the laws of member states.
The Regulation addresses only the most basic issues arising in cross-border insolvencies. 
